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  Terror and culpability  
 


Yesterday we witnessed some tragic deaths caused by the aerial bombardment carried out by Sri Lanka Air Force fighter jets. More than 20 bombs have been dropped, and a baby of six months and two infants of 4 and 8 years of age are among the 8 civilians killed in the attack. Unless there is substantial evidence to prove that these children lived not in their homes but in a LTTE camp, this attack can hardly be construed as one accurately targeted against an enemy position. Despite allegations from various quarters that indiscriminate air attacks do take place from time to time, the government authorities stubbornly cover up such instances as “succesfull sorties” or “missions accomplished”.

Not only in Sri Lanka but also in other places, air attacks cannot possibly be foolproof in spite of all modern technologies that have gone into making those killing machines. Last week we saw civilian Palestinians perished under Israel bombardment in the Gaza Stripe in spite of the Israel government’s stance that those attacks were aimed at Hamas fighters.

This brings to my mind what our veteran politician and trade unionist Bala Thampoe said a few days ago at J.R.Jayawardene Centre about the popular criterion to identify a terrorist from a non-terrorist, addressing a crowd of journalist fraternity that had gathered there after a public demonstration against the media suppression. While an attack against civilians carried out from the ground qualifies to be terroristic, an attack from the air is hailed as patriotic, he said.
Behind the common definition of terrorism there are two major suppositions: if the attacker is the State the act is justified and legal, whereas in case of an attack against the State, on whatever grounds, the label of terrorism comes to the fore. The popular thinking that it is solely the factor of civilians being targeted that is decisive in qualifying for terrorism is not always tenable. Of course, when a passenger bus at Mount Lavinia was targeted a few days back, civilian factor was the most appealing aspect of condemnation of the dastardly act. But when the same scenario was played out in Mannar a few weeks back, that factor was not highlighted that much, which means the level of identification of the civilian victims or potential civilian victims concerned in any given situation with the State had played a role in the final analysis of the word, terrorism. So, it is not just whether the victim is a civilian but whether that civilian victim can be identified with the State is the paramount yardstick here. The infants killed in Killinochchi were not civilians, for lack of their identification with the State. This same logic in reverse works in the mind of the terrorist as well. The civilian in the South for him is the State.

Second assumption relies on the presence of intention. The air force pilot does not intend to kill civilians in his air attacks whereas the LTTE activist intentionally kills civilians, which makes him a terrorist. But intention is not the only factor that proves the culpability. The knowledge, in the absence of intention, is as good as intention itself. No pilot can be so certain as to assume that his dropping a bomb would not harm any civilian even if we grant the available facilities of modern technology for his benefit. So, even though he may not have had any intention to kill an infant of 6 months of age he cannot be absolved from the burden of knowledge that this life other than that of the enemy could have been at risk when he dropped the bomb. It is not only a question of missing the target. Even if you hit the target accurately there is the possibility that the sheer destructive range of the bomb itself could in all probability harm unintended persons in the vicinity.



 
 
 
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